Euroland: peak of the upswing - little evidence of a new economy by Gern, Klaus-Jürgen
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Gern, Klaus-Jürgen
Working Paper
Euroland: peak of the upswing - little
evidence of a new economy
Kieler Diskussionsbeiträge, No. 369
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Gern, Klaus-Jürgen (2000) : Euroland: peak of the upswing - little evidence
of a new economy, Kieler Diskussionsbeiträge, No. 369, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2486KIELER DISKUSSIONSBEITRAGE
KIEL DISCUSSION PAPERS
Euroland: Peak of the Upswing —
Little Evidence of a New Economy
by Klaus-Jiirgen Gern, Christophe Kamps, Carsten-Patrick Meier and
Joachim Scheide
Contents
• In the summer of 2000, the economic expansion in Euroland has continued at a rapid pace. However, a number of
leading indicators suggest that the upswing will pass its peak in the second half of this year. Several reasons are re-
sponsible for the slowdown. The European Central Bank has corrected the expansionary course after the inflationary
risks in the euro area had increased; households and firms experience a reduction of real income due to the deterio-
ration of the terms of trade; finally the export boom is coming to an end as the world economy slows down somewhat
and the effects from the euro depreciation slowly fade.
• Real GDP will rise by 2.9 percent next year. While output growth will slow down gradually and approach the growth
rate of potential output, employment will continue to expand swiftly, and the unemployment rate will decline to around
8 percent by the end of 2001. Inflation will remain above the ECB's target of 2 percent for the rest of this year and
decelerate only moderately in the course of next year. While external factors will lose their impact, the core rate of
inflation will remain headed upwards.
• The situation of public budgets seems to improve as there will be large revenues from the sale of mobile phone li-
censes in a number of countries. European governments intend to use these receipts to reduce public debt. The
savings in terms of interest payments should also not be used to raise public spending. Sustained fiscal consolida-
tion requires that government expenditures increase at a lower rate than GDP over an extended period of time. This
is also necessary to support the course of lowering the tax burden in order to strengthen economic growth. Direct
taxes will be reduced considerably in 2001, the reduction will amount to some 0.8 percent of GDP. As a conse-
quence, structural budget deficits will rise.
• The increases of key interest rates can be justified on the basis of the strategy of the ECB. Since the beginning of
EMU, money growth has been higher than intended. Thus, there was a need for correction. Otherwise, the risks for
price level stability would have increased even more. The ECB should make sure that it will achieve its target of price
level stability because this is essential for its credibility. It is also important for the attractiveness of the monetary un-
ion in general. Stability risks in Euroland did, however, not emerge because of a wrong strategy but because the
strategy was not followed strictly enough by the ECB.
• In contrast to the situation in the United States,' there is not yet an acceleration of the increase in productivity in Euro-
land. However, the "new economy" will also gain ground in the euro area especially since the use of the internet is
increasing rapidly. But productivity gains will remain below those observed in the US partly because the share of the
computer industry is smaller. In addition, the advance of new technologies is connected with substantial structural
changes in the economy. If the gains in productivity are to materialize, product and labor markets must show suffi-
cient flexibility; this, however, is more likely in the US than in Euroland.
• The current weakness of the euro is usually explained by cyclical factors. Interest rate differentials as well as differ-
ences in economic growth play a key role. It can be shown that there is a close relationship between real interest
rate differentials and the real exchange rate. Growth differentials do not have much additional explanatory power. On
the basis of the model, a gradual appreciation of the euro towards parity vis-a-vis the US dollar is forecast.
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Economic expansion in Euroland has continued at a rapid pace in the summer of 2000. For the year as
a whole, an increase in real GDP of 3.4 percent can be expected. While this rate is slightly higher than
our previous forecast, we still expect that the upswing will pass its peak in the second half of this year.
Several leading indicators point in this direction, especially the results of industry surveys have started
to deteriorate slightly.
The slowdown is due to the weakening of several important factors. The European Central Bank
(ECB) has corrected its expansionary stance after inflationary risks in the euro area had increased.
Furthermore, households and firms are burdened by the deterioration of the terms of trade; the
additional oil bill for this year alone is equal to about 1 percent of GDP. The consequent reduction of
real income will also dampen economic activity. Finally, the export boom, which had been the main
driving force of the upswing for more than a year, will slowly come to an end. Not only will the
expansion of the world economy moderate, but also the stimulus resulting from the weakness of the
euro is likely to fade. A renewed set-back for the euro is not likely in the near future; this forecast is
derived in a model which will be later introduced and which explains the exchange rate quite well over
time.
All these factors imply that the upswing will lose momentum in the forecast period and that the rate
of increase of real GDP wil approach the growth rate of potential output; only fiscal policy will have
an expansionary effect in the coming year. A strong downturn, however, is not likely. This would
materialize only if, contrary to expectations, the inflationary tendencies aggravated and the ECB
turned to a restrictive stance.
Apart from the cyclical elements, it is to be investigated whether potential output growth ac-
celerates. So far, there is only very limited evidence for a new economy in the euro area. Therefore, it
cannot be expected that real GDP will increase by more than 2.5 percent over an extended period of
time.
1 Further Accelerated Upswing
Economic activity in Euroland moved up strongly in the first half of 2000. As in the preceding
semester real GDP increased at an annual rate of more than 3.5 percent (Figure 1). For the past twelve
months the speed of expansion considerably exceeded potential output growth, which we estimate to
be around 2.5 percent. The output gap, which had become larger in the wake of the crises in emerging
economies, should have closed in the meantime. According to surveys of the European Commission
capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector has continued to rise until recently and is substantially
above its long-term average. Leading indicators point to a continuation of the strong upswing in the
third quarter of 2000, even though at a slightly lower rate.
Exports whose recovery had brought about the turnaround in economic activity last year, have
evolved dynamically until recently (Figure 2). They have been pushed by the depreciation of the euro:
After its real effective exchange rate had already declined by 11 percent in the course of 1999, it went
down by another 3 percent between December and August. Apart from improved competitiveness
exporting companies in the euro area have benefited from the prosperous economic situation in the
most important sales markets. Because of the recovery of production in Southeast Asia and in Central
and Eastern Europe the demand from these regions has increased strongly as well. Furthermore, the
deliveries to the United States and to the United Kingdom have expanded lively since economic
activity in these two countries has hardly shown signs of deceleration. The export boom should have
carried on at a high pace in the third quarter; export expectations in Euroland reached a very high levelin July. In view of strong domestic demand imports have risen even faster than exports since the fall of
1999. In consequence, net exports have not contributed to real GDP growth.
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Meanwhile, domestic demand expansion further accelerated in the first semester of 2000. Especially
private consumption expenditures went up substantially stimulated by the positive evolution on the
labor market. According to estimates by the European Central Bank (ECB 2000: 26) the number of
employed persons has been increasing at an annual rate of 2 percent since the beginning of this year.
The unemployment rate according to the ILO concept declined to 9.1 percent in July, the lowest level
since the spring of 1992. In view of favorable financing conditions and excellent sales and profitexpectations, companies in the euro area have expanded their investment considerably. As capacity
utilization is above average and is further increasing, gross fixed capital formation and labor demand
will remain vigorous in the coming months. In view of consumers' unclouded optimism, private
consumption will continue to rise at a high pace, although no acceleration can be expected due to the
real income losses in the wake of the oil price surge.
The bright overall picture is stained by the accelerated increase in consumer prices. Between
December and July, the seasonally adjusted Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) rose at a
rate of more than 2 percent. In July, it was 2.4 percent higher than one year before, a rate that
substantially exceeds the medium-term reference value of the ECB. Yet it is above all the energy
component of the index that has risen in the wake of higher quotations on the market for crude oil,
whereas the core inflation rate (HICP without energy, food, alcohol and tobacco) has only moved up
slightly in recent months. However, we expect that companies in the euro area will increasingly
exhaust the scope for raising prices arising from the still strong economic expansion.
2 Fiscal Policy: Windfall Gains and Tax Cuts
At first sight the situation of public finances in Euroland looks outstandingly well. In the year 2000,
the consolidated budget of EMU countries will exhibit a surplus for the first time since the 1960s; it
will amount to 0.3 percent in relation to nominal GDP. At the same time the public debt ratio will
make a great leap in direction of the reference value — 60 percent in relation to GDP — laid down in
the Maastricht Treaty (Table 1). Are European governments indeed intensifying their course of fiscal
consolidation? Since 1990, when the structural deficit ratio reached its highest level of more than
5 percent, fiscal policy without any doubt has made considerable progress on the road to a balanced
budget on a medium-term basis. However, consolidation efforts have perceptibly waned in the recent
past. Closer inspection reveals that the budget surplus arising this year is above all due to one-off
revenues. Since these windfall gains will be considerably lower next year, the budget will once more
display a deficit.
In 2000 and 2001, several countries of the euro area will obtain a large amount of extra revenue in
the wake of the allocation of mobile phone licenses (UMTS) (Table 2). The Statistical Office of the
European Communities (Eurostat 2000b) has decided that these receipts have to be fully recorded at





























































































































































































Source: OECD (2000a), national sources, own estimates and forecasts.
the time of the completion of the sale, irrespective of the time of payment. Thus, the license receipts
have immediate implications for the budget. As a consequence, the meaning of fiscal indicators like
the structural budget deficit is reduced. By definition, the structural deficit is reduced by the amount of
the special revenues because they are not due to cyclical fluctuations. But this does not mean that
fiscal policy becomes more restrictive. The profit burden loaded on the license purchasers will
probably not decrease capital formation in the telecommunications sector. Some of the involved com-
panies have already announced that the construction of the UMTS network will be accelerated in the
coming years. Moreover, the license expenses are tax-deductible. All in all, the license payments
should not exert a contractive effect on economic activity.
The intention of European governments to use most of the license revenue to reduce public debt is
highly welcome. The savings in terms of interest payments, however, should not be used to raise
public spending as planned by governments. A sustained fiscal consolidation requires that government
expenditures increase at a lower rate than GDP over an extended period of time. In order to be
prepared for the challenges which ensue from population aging, governments in Euroland should not
deviate from the course of strict expenditure discipline. Of course, expenditure constraints do not
prevent efficiency-enhancing changes in the structure of government spending — on the contrary: A
reorientation of resources from transfer systems to public investment or increased promotion of human
capital formation is required.
Moreover, it is necessary to stick to expenditure discipline in order to give room to the tax cuts that
are planned for the coming years. Otherwise, there would be the risk that budget deficits increase
beyond the Maastricht threshold if economic activity deteriorated. We welcome the endeavor of
European governments to strengthen economic growth by reducing the tax burden, which is still very
high. Especially the large countries in the euro area plan to cut direct taxes considerably in the year
2001 (Table 2). For Euroland as a whole the measures should add up to 0.8 percent in relation to GDP.
Thus, fiscal policy will move to an expansionary course next year. As a consequence, the consolidated
budget of the euro area will exhibit a deficit.
3 ECB Reacts to Inflationary Risks
Monetary conditions in the euro area are not as favorable as they were half a year ago. The ECB raised
key interest rates further. Since the beginning of September the main refinancing rate stands at 4.5
percent. This means that this rate — as well as the other key interest rates — is 1 percentage point
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real terms, the short-term interest rate is only slightly lower than the long-term average. If the core
inflation rate is used instead of the headline inflation, the real interest rate is somewhat higher than the
average over the past years, which we consider the neutral rate. The interest rate policy of the ECB has
contributed to the deceleration of M3 growth. While there was an acceleration until April to more than7 percent, the rate declined until July to approximately 5.5 percent.
1 Nevertheless, M3 is still growing
faster than intended by the ECB according to the reference value of 4.5 percent. Long-term interest
rates hardly changed in recent months, the yield for 10-year government bonds remained close to
5.5 percent until the beginning of September; in real terms, long-term interest rates went down
somewhat and are below the long-term average. There was a further stimulation from the renewed
depreciation of the euro; its real external value declined in the six months until August by about
3 percent. We expect that the ECB will raise key interest rates again by 25 basis points in the coming
weeks mainly because of the persistently high rate of inflation. Furthermore, monetary expansion will
slow down further, and the euro will appreciate slightly in the forecasting period. All in all, monetary
conditions will become less favorable so that economic activity is not stimulated anymore.
The turnaround of interest rates, which started in November last year, can be justified on the basis
of several gauges for monetary policy; also the size of the increase was adequate. Since the beginning
of the monetary union, M3 has expanded faster than intended by the ECB. If we use different
estimates for the determinants of the reference value than the ECB we also conclude that monetary
expansion has been too high. This can be shown, for example, by using the McCallum Rule (Figure 4).
This rule is more flexible with regard to the estimation of trend values (real GDP and velocity) which
are necessary to gauge the stance of monetary policy; it is thus more "flexible" than the rule of the
ECB (Gern et al. 1999: 7). Because of the liquidity overhang, risks for price level stability have
emerged. In order to slow down monetary expansion, it was necessary to raise the price for central
bank money.
The short-term interest rate which follows from the Taylor Rule has been going up for some time
(Figure 5).
2 On the basis of this rule, the end of the low-interest-rate policy can also be justified;
Figure 4: Expansion of M3 in Euroland: Acutal Values and Values According to the McCallum Rule
a
Percent
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
aYear-over-year increase of M3. Forecast starting 2000 III.
1997 1998 1999 2000
1 The calculations are based on the six-month comparison.
L For calculating the Taylor interest rate, it is necessary to estimate the equilibrium real interest rate and the output gap.
These estimates are subject to considerable uncertainty (Gern et al. 1999: 7).10
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otherwise, economic activity would have been stimulated too strongly. Currently the Taylor interest
rate is even slightly higher than the market rate especially because inflation is above the target. If the
core rate of inflation is used for the calculation, the interest rate is around 4.5 percent; this rate will go
up in the coming quarters because both the output gap as the well as the core inflation rate are likely to
increase.
The main reason for the interest rate hikes by the ECB was the risk to price level stability; since the
beginning of this year, inflation in the euro area has mostly been higher than the upper bound of the
ECB target range. In July, the year-over-year increase of the HICP was not below 2 percent in any of
the eleven countries. Inflation was especially high in those countries that had a high capacity util-
ization already prior to the monetary union and which had to reduce interest rates strongly before
EMU started.
The ECB must make sure that its target for price level stability is not violated for a longer period of
time. This does not mean that the course of monetary policy has to be tightened just because of higher
oil prices or because of the weak euro. The ECB has to prevent the core rate of inflation from rising.
This is not only important for its reputation. Maintaining price level stability is also one of the
conditions that makes the European Monetary Union as a whole attractive, especially to those EU
members which will decide about their entry to the monetary union. If inflation in the euro area is
higher than in those countries, it would be difficult to convince the public that joining EMU has
advantages. Also, it is possible that the monetary policy strategy of the ECB will be questioned again.
Proponents of inflation targeting, a strategy that is rejected by the ECB, will gain ground if, for
example, the inflation target in the United Kingdom is achieved, whereas it is missed in the euro area.
According to our judgment, the risks to price level stability in Euroland have not emerged because the
strategy of the ECB is wrong, but mainly because it was not followed strictly enough by the ECB. As
the reference value for M3 had been missed already since the beginning of 1999, the interest rate hikes
even came too late.11
4 Currently Only Little Evidence for a New Economy in Euroland
It is often claimed that the progressive use of new technologies in data processing and telecom-
munication (ICT)
3 has brought a new era, the so-called new economy. In the following, "new
economy" is understood as an upward shift in the productivity trend in the economy with the
consequence of an increased growth rate of potential output, also referred to as the "speed limit" of the
economy. Developments in the United States during the 1990s suggest that something like a new
economy has indeed arrived: Productivity accelerated markedly towards the end of the decade, and
potential output growth picked up considerably (Gern et al. 2000).
In contrast, there is no discernible rise in trend productivity growth since the start of the 1990s in
the euro area (Figure 6). This may partly be due to the fact that employment growth accelerated in
Euroland during the 1990s as a consequence of labor market reforms and more wage moderation. This
had a dampening effect on measured productivity. Another explanation may lie in different method-
ologies used to split up the value of production into a price component and a volume component; this
results in a lower estimate of productivity growth in the ICT sector in Euroland compared to that in the
United States.
4 Apart from measurement problems, a major reason for the absence of the new econ-
omy in Euroland statistics is that the share of ICT industries in total output is lower than in the United
States.
5 Despite the relatively small (but rising) weight of ICT industries in the economy they account
for a significant part of the rise in overall productivity because productivity growth in these sectors is
so rapid. Finally, it is important that the United States have a substantial lead as far as the implemen-
tation of the new technologies is concerned. While at the end of the 1990s nearly 40 percent of the
United States population used the internet, the share was below 10 percent in Germany and France,
although it was rising rapidly (Davies et al. 2000). Lower diffusion of new technologies may not only
lead to correspondingly lower productivity gains; it is also possible that productivity effects are absent
altogether or even negative as long as the use of new technologies has not reached a "critical mass"
that allows, for instance, to exploit network externalities.
An important aspect for future developments is the use of the internet for trade among businesses
(B2B) or between businesses and consumers (B2C). While the market share of trade via internet
platforms is still extremely small, enormous growth is projected, particularly as concerns B2B (Davies
et al. 2000: 15ff.). Given the importance of multinational companies and the intense international
competition, this trend will not be confined to the United States but can be expected to progress in
Euroland at a similar speed.
In principle, the use of the internet lowers the cost of information dramatically, and makes the
search for suitable inputs easier as well as the comparison of prices. The result will be lower
production costs, partly because of more efficient input combinations, partly because of fiercer price
competition among suppliers. According to simulations, the direct effect on prices can be substantial:
Given unchanged quantities, the price level in the five largest industrial countries would decline by at
least 3.5 percent (Davies et al. 2000: 18). However, there will be a rise in output working in the
opposite direction which will be the result of increased demand as a reaction to lower prices. In
addition, demand will be stimulated by asset prices that can be expected to rise in line with the
economic expansion and higher profit expectations. That said, the discussion of possible price effects
of B2B has to be speculative at the current juncture. There is little empirical evidence by now, and the
evidence that is available is mixed (OECD 2000b: 204).
ICT stands for Information, Computer, and Telecommunication.
Deutsche Bundesbank (2000), for instance, calculates that in the years 1991-1999 German real investment in data
processing equipment would be four times higher if the US deflator was used instead of the German deflator. The
difference in the deflators can be assumed to be mainly the result of different methodologies.
In the mid-1990s, ICT industries produced 3.3 percent of GDP in five countries representing 85 percent of the Euroland
economy as compared to 4.4 percent in the United States (OECD 2000b: 181).12
Figure 6: Productivity
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All in all, contrary to the United States, at present there is no evidence of an increase in trend
productivity in Euroland. Only part of the different behavior of the economies can be explained away
by differences in statistical methodologies used for compiling the relevant data. Of major importance
seems to be the fact that new technologies are less prominent in production and use in Euroland as
compared to the United States. While it can be expected that the new economy will be increasingly
visible also in the euro area mainly due to the rapid spreading of the internet, productivity gains will
remain significantly lower than those seen in the United States for the time being because ICT pro-
duction will continue to constitute a smaller share of economic activity. Finally, the implementation of
the new technologies implies a substantial structural change for the economy. Flexibility on product
and labor markets that is necessary to reap the possible productivity gains quickly and completely
seems to be less present in Euroland than in the United States.
5 Implications of the New Economy for Monetary Policy
The new economy would have consequences for monetary policy. These can clearly be derived within
the strategy of the ECB. If there is an acceleration of potential output growth, a higher reference value
for M3 is adequate according to the first pillar; otherwise, inflation would be lower than intended.
Also, according to the second pillar of the ECB strategy, a neutral (stability-oriented) monetary policy
implies a stronger expansion of the money stock. It has to be considered, however, that for the
definition of the reference value an estimate for the trend of velocity is required as well. In the
literature on monetary theory, transaction costs play an important role. It can be expected that with the
advance of new technologies transactions can be made at a lower cost than would be the case
otherwise. Since economic agents reduce their cash balances, money demand declines and the velocity
of money increases. This effect would by itself raise inflation (Casares 2000). How important this
effect is would have to be estimated empirically; the change in the reference value due to higher
potential output growth would have to be reduced accordingly. Apart from the new definition of a path13
for the money stock, other monetary variables are affected as well. For example, the real equilibrium
interest rate in the economy increases with the higher increase in productivity.
Although the reaction of the ECB to the new economy is clear in principle, practical policy is facing
substantial problems. The identification of a new economy is only possible if macroeconomic shocks
can be correctly identified.
6 The identification of a change in trend growth is very difficult empiri-
cally, especially for the most recent observations which are affected if we talk about the new economy.
The current strong upswing in Euroland can certainly also be explained by impulses on the demand
side: Monetary policy has been expansionary for some time, and there were substantial impulses from
abroad. In this sense, it is the "classic" business cycle pattern. Of course, it cannot be excluded that the
rate of technological progress has risen. However, since there is hardly any clear-cut evidence con-
cerning the new economy, it is impossible to advise the ECB to loosen monetary policy.
In general, changes in potential output growth can be identified with some certainty only after a few
years.
7 This implies a problem for monetary policy which can hardly be solved. Given this uncertainty
about the "true" trend, the ECB can make two errors: Either it reacts only with a lag to an actual accel-
eration of potential output growth, or it loosens monetary policy although there is no such accel-
eration. The consequences of the first error should hardly be serious because supply shocks such as a
jump in technology usually lead to an immediate increase in production. In a world of rigid prices, this
increase would be higher in the short-run if monetary expansion accelerated. However, a " passive"
behavior of the ECB would not prevent that the new economy would lead to a faster increase in real
GDP. The consequences of the second error will probably be more serious. Inflation would be higher,
and the ECB would have to change towards restriction. This way, not only cyclical fluctuations would
increase; there would also be the risk that monetary policy would have to be tightened in a period
when the effects of the new economy materialize. All in all, there are good reasons to be cautious
when interpreting data concerning the new economy; without empirical evidence, the ECB should not
change its course.
Apart from that, the risk that the ECB is providing too little liquidity is not relevant in the current
situation anyhow. Since the beginning of the monetary union, the money stock has increased much
faster than intended, it is currently 2 percent higher than intended by the ECB. This means that the
new economy — if it is really emerging in Euroland — is not prevented at all.
6 Determinants of the Euro's Exchange Rate
The current weakness of the euro is commonly explained by short-run macroeconomic factors. The
discussion primarily focuses on differences in interest rates and in the rates of growth of real GDP. In
the following section, we analyze whether these factors can explain the recent development of the euro
and whether they can be used for forecasting.
6.1 Interest Rate Differentials
Starting point of the analysis is a standard exchange rate model, a so-called sticky-price monetary
model.
8 According to the assumptions of the model, the nominal exchange rate is in the long-run equal
to the difference between the price level at home and abroad, that is, purchasing power parity obtains
This is a general problem for monetary policy. For example, the ECB has to identify whether a strong increase in GDP
is due to a demand or a supply shock, because the reaction will depend on that. To be more precise, there are many
distinctions that monetary policy has to consider: A jump in the level versus a change in the trend, transitory versus
permanent shocks etc. All the effects would have different consequences for monetary policy.
International organizations such as the OECD (2000b) have hardly changed their estimates concerning potential output
growth until the year 2001.
See Dornbusch (1976) and the version augmented by inflation expectations by Frankel (1979). For a survey of the
literature, see Frankel and Rose (1995).14
in the long run. In the short run, however, deviations from purchasing power parity may occur as
goods prices adjust only slowly to shocks — such as changes in interest rates — while the nominal
exchange rate adjusts quickly to fulfill the uncovered interest parity condition.
9 The latter is assumed
to hold permanently as a result of low transaction costs on financial markets. It can be shown that the
combination of uncovered interest parity with long-run purchasing power parity implies a close
relation between the difference in real interest rates and the real exchange rate (see Box). For example,
an increase of US real interest rates relative to European rates causes a depreciation of the euro.
Box: An Econometric Model of the US Dollar/Euro Exchange Rate
A close relationship between the exchange rate and the interest rate differential is suggested by the uncovered interest
parity condition. According to this condition, the difference between interest rates at home and abroad for a ^-period invest-
ment at time t, k it and k i*, respectively, has to equal the expected rate of appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Let
et be the logarithm of the current nominal exchange rate (US dollar per euro) and let E, {e,+k) be its expected value k
quarters ahead, the condition can be approximated as
(1) k't -kh =-(Et(e,+k)-et).
Adding the difference of the expected price changes E,(p,+k)-p, -(£•,(/?*+*)-p*) on both sides, one gets the real





where q is the real exchange rate, q, = e, - p* + p,, and r is the real interest rate according to the Fisher-relation
k
rt-k't -[E,(p,+k)-Pt) • The equation states that for an international portfolio to be allocated optimally, higher real
interest rates, say, in the United States (r-r* <0) have to be compensated by an expected depreciation of the dollar
against the euro.
Assume further that purchasing power parity holds in the long run, that is, the real exchange rate qt reverts to its mean in
the long run. In this case, any deviation of the current real exchange rate from q implies a certain expected rate of change
in the real exchange rate depending on the speed of adjustment towards purchasing power parity, fy. If the real dollar/euro
rate was currently 20 percent below its purchasing power parity level, the market would expect this deviation to be
corrected over the next k quarters by the fraction fy. This implies:
(3) ek(q,-q) = -(E,(ql+k)-ql), 0<0k<l
where Gj, is the higher, the larger the influence of the exchange rate on aggregate demand is, the higher the speed of
adjustment of goods prices is, and the longer the adjustment horizon k is.
Inserting (3) and (2) gives a relationship between the deviation of the real exchange rate from purchasing power parity and
the real interest rate differential. Solving for the current real exchange rate one obtains
(4) q, =q+± (tr,-tr;).
" k
This is the relation assumed as the long-run relation in the empirical implementation. In the short run, there may be
deviations from the long-run relation, for instance, due to lagged adjustments.
Uncovered interest parity is an arbitrage condition for the international capital market. It means that differences in
interest rates between two investments that are identical — apart from its currency denomination — should be matched
by the expected rate of depreciation of the currency with the higher interest rate.15
Box continued
Empirical estimation uses the data described in the text for the period of 1973:2 to 2000:1. The dynamic equation is first
specified as an error-correction model with six lagged first-difference terms.
a Dropping insignificant short-run variables,
the following equation for the quarterly change in the real US dollar/euro rate results (f-values in parenthesis):














2 =0.531, STDERR = 0.034, DW= 1.945, JB [0.361], AR(l) [0.709], AR(4) [0.878], A/?(8) [0.960], ARCH{A) [0.259],
Wh [0.963], marginal levels of significance in squared brackets. / are dummy variables that assume the value 1 in the
respective quarter and 0 otherwise. 5gl.j is 0 up to 1980:4 and 1 thereafter).
The estimated long-run relationship implies that an increase in the real interest rate differential by one percentage point in
favor of the euro area leads to a real appreciation of the euro vis-a-vis the dollar by 3.03 percent. Adjustment towards the
long run is, however, slow. In the quarter of the interest rate shock, the euro only appreciates by 0.37 percent. According to
the estimated adjustment parameter of 0.162, it takes approximately one year for a deviation from the long-run relation to
be reduced by half.
To assess the forecast performance of the model, the equation is estimated first only until 1993:4. Based on the estimates,
forecasts are generated for the real dollar/euro rate over the next 1, 2, 3, 4 8 and 12 quarters. Subsequently, one more
quarter is added to the estimation period and a new set of 1- to 12-step-ahead forecasts are generated, and so on, until
2000:1. The following table presents the root mean squared forecast errors (RMSE) for these forecasts and compares them
to those of a random walk model generated with the same procedure. The RMSE of the model for each forecast horizon is
close to the standard error of equation (5) of 3.4 percent. The RMSE of the random walk, in contrast, increases with the
forecast horizon from 4 to more than 16 percent. Thus, the model outperforms the random walk over each horizon: As one
would expect, the advantage is higher for longer-run forecasts.
Table: Root Mean Squared Forecast Errors
































aWe assume stationarity of both the real interest rate differential and the real exchange rate. For the latter, this
is corresponding to the findings of numerous studies (Rogoff 1996). For the former, an Augmented-Dickey-Fuller test
rejects the hypothesis of nonstationarity. — 'To see whether simultaneity between the real exchange rate and the difference
in goods prices, whose rate of change enters the equation contemporaneously via the real interest rate differential, biases
the estimates, the real interest differential is separated in its nominal components. In the estimation, these are instrumented
by variables which correlate highly with them. The parameter estimates change only marginally. —
 cThe root mean
I T T"
squared error is given by: RMSE = I— ^,[Y,+k-Y^ 1 .where Y is the actual and K/the forecast value, k the forecast
horizon and T the number of observations used for the calculation. In the present case T is between 14 (for k=\2) and 25
(for ft = 1).16
Figure 7: Real Exchange Rate
a US Dollar/Euro (D-Mark) and Real Interest Differential
b
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aReal exchange rate and real interest rate differential calculted on the basis of industrial goods prices. — "Moving
2-quarter average.
When testing this model empirically for the dollar/euro exchange rate, one faces the problem that
the euro has only been traded since January 1999. As data for six quarters is not sufficient to allow
statistically reliable results, the D-mark is treated as the precursor of the euro on financial markets.
1
0
Accordingly, data for the United States are compared with data for the euro area for the period since
1999 and for Germany for the period before. Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between the real
exchange rate and the real interest rate differential for the period of the first quarter of 1970 to the
second quarter of 2000. The 3-month money market rates are used as nominal interest rates, expected
inflation is proxied by the annualized change of industrial goods prices over the previous quarter
11,
and the real exchange rate is the quarterly average of the nominal exchange rate corrected for the
difference in industrial goods prices.
A dynamic econometric equation for the period of 1973:2 to 2000:1 explains more than 50 percent
of the variance of the quarterly changes of the real exchange rate.
1
2 The estimated long-run parameters
imply that an increase of US over European real interest rates by 1 percentage point leads to a
depreciation of the euro by 3 percent. The forecast error is relatively small: For out-of-sample




It is principally possible to construct a "synthetic" euro from national statistics for the time period before 1999 (see
Clostermann and Schnatz 2000). The use of the D-mark as the precursor of the euro has the advantage that the D-mark
floated relatively freely against nonmembers of the European Monetary System (EMS). This is not true for the other
EMS currencies. Their exchange rates against EMS currencies deviated from that of the D-mark because they
depreciated vis-a-vis the D-mark in the course of various realignments of the EMS parities. Magnitude and timing of
such realignments, however, were mainly political decisions, only loosely connected with macroeconomic
fundamentals. Therefore, the relation between the fundamentals and the exchange rates of these currencies can be
expected to be weaker than for the D-mark. The euro is not determined by such political factors; its behavior is thus
likely to be more similar to that of the D-mark than to a "synthetic" precursor.
Using the industrial goods prices has the advantage that purchasing power parity can be expected to hold better than for
consumer prices, which comprise large components of goods that are not traded internationally.
See Meier (1999) for a similar model for the D-mark/US dollar rate and van Aarle et al. (2000) for a different approach
for modeling the euro exchange rate.17
eight or twelve quarters ahead in the period of 1994:1 to 2000:1, the forecast error of the model is
consistently below that of a "naive" forecast that uses the recent realized value as the forecast (random
walk).
Overall, the analysis confirms a relatively close relationship between the real exchange rate and real
interest rates for the dollar/euro and the dollar/D-mark relation, respectively.
6.2 Growth Differentials
Another often-cited explanation for euro's current weakness are the substantial differences between
the growth rates of real GDP on both sides of the Atlantic. Differences in growth rates can indeed
influence exchange rates, the relative price of two currencies. According to the monetary theory of
exchange rates, an increase in US relative to European production causes a real depreciation of the
euro: Real money demand increases in the United States, so real interest rates rise with the
consequence that international investors increase their demand for dollars as they attempt to shift their
investments to the United States. Alternatively, one may argue that higher growth means higher
demand for capital and thus higher real interest rates. Again, the consequence is that the currency of
the country that is growing faster appreciates in real terms.
Both lines of argument also indicate, however, that in a model that controls for real interest
differentials, there may not be much left to be explained by differences in GDP growth since the latter
difference usually comes along with the former. In the end, both variables are only symptoms of the
underlying demand and supply side processes. To test this hypothesis, the difference in the growth
rates of industrial production between Euroland (Germany) and the United States is used as an




6.3 Explaining Recent Developments
Figure 8 shows the actual nominal dollar/euro rate and a dynamic ex post forecast generated with the
model presented in the box starting in 1990:1. The equation obviously explains most of the actual
developments. Even the devaluation of the euro since the start of the European Monetary Union in
1999 is "predicted" by the model; recent developments, thus, seem to a large extent justified in terms
of the fundamentals of the model, that is, nominal interest rates and prices. However, the equation
predicts the euro's depreciation to start in the fourth quarter of 1999 whereas the actual depreciation
already started at the beginning of the year. Moreover, the model significantly underestimates the
magnitude of the devaluation. It is true, deviations between actual and predicted values of that size
have occurred also in earlier periods, for instance in 1991/92. Special factors that are not included in
the model may be the reason. However, large forecast errors may also indicate that the estimated
relationship is not stable. The fact that a dummy variable — that has the value 1 starting with the first
quarter of 1999 — is statistically significant is in favor of this hypothesis.
1
4 With this variable
included the equation tracks recent developments much closer. Other formal tests, however, do not
No long-run statistical impact of the difference in growth rates is found once one controls for the fact that the growth
difference is not "exogenous" but itself influenced by the real exchange rate. Changes in the growth rate difference,
however, have a significant impact on the current real exchange rate with a lag of eight quarters.
Such a jump in the real exchange rate could indicate that with the change to the euro, the risk premium for holding
dollars has declined. This could be expected if the euro area as a whole had a smaller net foreign asset position (in
relation to GDP) than Germany alone. Unfortunately, this hypothesis cannot be checked empirically due to lack of data
for the euro area. Still, the fact that in the past Germany tended to have by far the highest current account surpluses
among all countries in the euro area supports this view. Another explanation could be that the European Central Bank
lacks the reputation of the Bundesbank and the euro therefore is discounted on financial markets. This may, however, be
only temporary. We expect that the European Central Bank will achieve its target of price level stability. If the markets
reach the same conclusion, the risk premium — if it exists —will disappear.18
point to a structural change at the end of the sampling period. We assume that the recent deviation
between the predicted and the actual exchange rate is only temporary.
Figure 8: Nominal US Dollar/Euro Rate and Dynamic Ex Post Forecast
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aBefore 1999, the D-mark is used instead of the euro, converted at the rate of 1.95583 D-mark/euro.
This assumption is also the basis of our forecast. For the third quarter of 2000 the equation predicts
a euro rate close to parity vis-a-vis the dollar whereas the actual rate is about 0.90 dollar. We presume
that the difference between the fundamentally justified level of the exchange rate as given by the
equation and the actual rate will become smaller in the forecast period. In addition, the real interest
rate differential will move in favor of the euro: While according to our assumption nominal interest
rates will increase slightly more in the United States than in the euro area, European producer price
inflation rate will fall more than in the United States. On the basis of the model, one can expect that
the nominal dollar/euro exchange rate will be somewhat below parity at the end of 2001.
7 Outlook: Upswing Loses Momentum
Starting in fall of 2000, economic activity will evolve less dynamically than before (Figure 9). This is
suggested by several leading indicators. Confidence in the industrial sector has weakened somewhat
since the middle of the year, and the assessment of orders is less optimistic than before. Furthermore,
the decline in the Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI) points at a slower pace of expansion. The
slowdown in economic activity will not be dramatic, however, since consumer confidence remains
near its historical peak and since the composite economic sentiment indicator calculated by the
European Commission is still at a high level, too.
For the year 2000 as a whole, we expect real GDP to rise by 3.4 percent. Employment should
continue to expand rapidly, and the unemployment rate will average 9 percent, down from 10 percent
in 1999. Consumer price inflation will weaken only gradually and will not fall below the upper
boundary defined by the ECB (2 percent) until the end of this year; on average, the HICP will exceed
its level in the previous year by 2.2 percent.19
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aSeasonally adjusted. —
 bAnnualized quarterly rate of change in percent. — Percentage change over previous year.
Calculated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter.
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aAt constant prices. —
 bPercentage change over previous year. —
 cChange of net exports over previous year in percent of
GDP in the same quarter of previous year.
In the coming year, the upswing will slow down further; around the end of the forecast horizon real
GDP will not grow faster than potential output anymore (Table 3). The impulses coming from abroad
will decline perceptibly. Demand increase in the United States and in the United Kingdom will flatten
out; at the same time economic activity in Southeast Asia and in Central and Eastern Europe should20
expand at a slower pace than this year. Moreover, the stimulus stemming from the depreciation of the
euro will fade. We assume that its real effective exchange rate will appreciate slightly in the course of
the coming year. As a consequence the increase in exports will be substantially lower than in 2000.
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 dContribution to change in GDP. —
including intra-Euroland trade. —
 fIn percent of the labor force, harmonized according to
over previous year in percent. —
 hIndex 1999 I = 100.
the ILO concept. — ^Change
Source: Eurostat (2000a), ECB (2000), OECD (2000a), own calculations and forecasts.
Domestic demand will expand at a still high rate in the first half of next year (Figure 10). The
underlying trend will slow down somewhat, however, as monetary conditions do not stimulate
economic activity anymore. Yet the effects stemming from the fiscal impulse will dominate until the
middle of the year. Tax cuts and the further rise in capacity utilization point at a rapid expansion of
gross fixed capital formation. Furthermore, employment will grow at an only slightly reduced pace
since we expect wage increases to be moderate next year, too. Unemployment will decline further to
about 8 percent at the end of 2001, the lowest rate in the past ten years. The tax reliefs decided in
several euro area countries will temporarily boost private consumption expenditures. All in all we
expect real GDP to rise by 2.9 percent in 2001 (Table 4).
Inflation rates will decelerate only slightly in the coming year. While the price increases due to
external developments, which dominated this year, will gradually fade — we expect quotations on the
international crude oil market to decline slowly and the real effective exchange rate of the euro to
appreciate slightly —, the core rate of inflation will go up considerably as the scope for increasing
prices is enlarged due to the continued rise in capacity utilization. Against this background, we expect










































































aBased on GDP in current prices and exchange rates
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). — ^Standardized i
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Source: CB (2000), OECD (2000a), own calculations and estimates.
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